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INTRODUCTION
Insider trading is as common as it is illegal.' The result is
many high-profile insider trading cases stemming from government
enforcement of the ban on insider trading.2 For example, Mark
Cuban is the billionaire owner of the Dallas Mavericks franchise in
the National Basketball Association and a regular star on the
television show Shark Tank.3 Recently, he also became the star of a
high-profile insider trading case after he sold his stake in a
Canadian Internet company, Mamma.com, to avoid a $750,000 loss. 4
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1. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 264 (2007) (citing Illegal Insider Trading: How
Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate Criminal Enforcement?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2006)
(statement of Christopher K. Thomas, President, Measuredmarkets, Inc.))
("Testifying before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on September 26,
2006, Mr. Christopher Thomas, the founder of Measuredmarkets, an economic
consulting firm, presented data suggesting that more than forty percent of the
mergers with a value of $1 billion or more that were announced in the United
States over the twelve-month period ending in early July 2006 were preceded by
suspicious trading that appeared to be, in his words, 'deviant trading
behavior."'); see also Michelle N. Comeau, Comment, The Hidden Contradiction
Within Insider Trading Regulation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1275-76, 1290-91
(2006) ("[T]he roughly 475,000 insider trades executed each year consistently
net higher returns than the trades of ordinary investors. And the vast majority
are simply ignored by the Securities and Exchange Commission, either because
the trades were made for reasons other than the insider's confidential
knowledge, or because the government simply could not prove otherwise.").
2. See Matthew Goldstein, Ex-Trader at SAC Fund Is Sentenced to 3
Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2014, at B1 ("[T]he prison sentence, coupled with a
$2 million fine, was necessary to send a message to others on Wall Street that
insider trading is not a trivial crime."); Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge
Fund Billionaire Is Guilty of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, at Al
("Mr. Rajaratnam ... sought out information that was confidential ... and
illegally traded on it, a jury in Federal District Court . .. found[,] . .. convicting
him on all 14 counts of securities fraud and conspiracy.").
3. Dina El Boghdady, Mark Cuban Is Cleared in SEC Case, WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 2013, at A16.
4. Id.
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The insider trading case the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") brought against him dominated the media, highlighting the
government's efforts to enforce the insider trading prohibition.5
Ultimately, however, the SEC failed to make its case that Cuban
received confidential, material, nonpublic information that caused
him to trade his Mamma.com stock.6
The Cuban case was not the first high-profile insider trading
case that the government lost,7 and it certainly was not the first
SEC setback.8 On the contrary, the high-profile defeat for the
government in the Cuban case was a culmination of calls to
Congress to reexamine the insider trading legislation, which had
already been the target of criticism for being ambiguous.9
However, despite its high-profile losses, the SEC has committed
to prosecuting insider trading: the agency has filed record numbers
of insider trading actions in recent years, totaling hundreds of
cases.10 Indeed, upon the SEC's loss of the Cuban trial, an agency
5. See id.; Ben Protess & Lauren D'Avolio, Jury Rules for Cuban in
Setback for S.E.C., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2013, at B1.
6. See Protess & D'Avolio, supra note 5, at B1.
7. Readers may recall the attempted insider trading prosecution of
Martha Stewart. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The
Case of Martha Stewart, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2023 (2005).
8. Other failures include the fact that "[iun the past two decades, two of
the most significant instances of industry-wide misconduct were uncovered by
academics, not the SEC." Jonathan G. Katz, Reviewing the SEC,
Reinvigorating the SEC, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 489, 495 (2010). Also, "[diespite
years of investigation, and the signing of the first memorandum of
understanding between the SEC and a foreign country (Switzerland), the SEC
never succeeded in cracking the mysterious case of insider trading conducted by
unknown persons trading through an obscure Swiss bank, Ellis AG." Id.
In another celebrated case, Eliot Spitzer, then Attorney General of
New York, exposed the widespread practice by mutual funds of
permitting certain large traders to buy or redeem fund shares at that
day's price, rather than the following day's price. Interestingly,
Spitzer's case began with a secret tip from an industry source, who
chose to go to a state Attorney General rather than to the official
regulator, the SEC.
Id. at 496; see also Peter J. Henning, Should the SEC Spin off the Enforcement
Division?, 11 TRANSACTIONS 121, 121-22 (2009) ("The SEC's mishaps range from
failing to uncover a Ponzi scheme to a completely mismanaged insider trading
investigation. There is even the possibility that SEC staff engaged in insider
trading.").
9. Phyllis Lipka Skupien, What's at Stake for Insider Trading Prosecutions
After U.S. v. Newman, 20 WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG., no. 23, 2015, at 1, 2;
see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 646 (2010) ("[T]he
SEC in recent years has attempted to expand the contours of the law, which
makes it easier for them to bring cases, and to keep the law vague by refusing
to define insider trading.").
10. See Mitchell A. Agee, Friends in Low Places: How the Law Should Treat
Friends in Insider Trading Cases, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 346-47 (2013);
2012 Year-End Securities Enforcement Update, GIBsON DUNN (Jan. 9, 2013),
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spokesman said, "While the verdict in this particular case is not the
one we sought, it will not deter us from bringing and trying cases
where we believe defendants have violated the federal securities
laws."11 In the aftermath of the Cuban case, the SEC maintained
that its chief concern was being able to prosecute insider trading
cases. 12
Much attention has focused on shoring up the legal framework
on insider trading to increase the success of these prosecutions,13
but some attention should also be paid to the question of how to
catch insider trading. An empirical analysis of insider trading helps
with this task. Accordingly, Part I of this Article sets the legal
framework and reviews the ongoing debate over insider trading,
while Part II turns to an empirical examination of the impact of
insider trading on market performance and price distortion.
Part II employs a data set generated from SEC litigation
releases, using a series of time-stamped trades prosecuted by the
SEC to generate data files for both daily trading and intraday
trading intervals. This data provides a natural experiment to
examine the effects of insider behavior as the prosecution provides
an ex post identification of insider trading within the larger pool of
liquidity trades. In all the cases, the defendants traded on the basis
of inside information, contravening federal law. The defendants are
either insiders-corporate officers who received private information
in the course of their duties---or individuals who received
information from corporate officers but do not have a duty to the
corporation. Analyzing this data, this Article finds that these trades
differ from surrounding trades in both trade-to-trade price impact
and trade lot volume, information that should aid the government in
identifying and prosecuting insider trading.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON INSIDER TRADING
While there are many ways of defining insider trading 4 and
several theories on which to prosecute it,15 insider trading is
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEnd-Securities-
Enforcement-Update.pdf; see also Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92
B.U. L. REV. 577, 610 (2012) ("[T]he SEC had always portrayed itself as a
punisher where insider trading was concerned .....
11. Protess & D'Avolio, supra note 5, at B1.
12. See Peter Lattman & Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Report Clears Agency in
Mark Cuban Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at B4.
13. See, e.g., Edward Green & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 416-17.
14. Sanford Grossman, for example, defines informed traders as those
traders who know "the true underlying probability distribution which generates
a future price, and they take a position in the market based on this
information." Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock
Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573 (1976).
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essentially when a corporate insider or another party in possession
of proprietary, nonpublic information trades upon it.16 The insider
trading legal framework developed in an ad hoc way through
rulemaking and court decisions, and is far from elegant, as outlined
in this Part. However, plaguing it is the debate whether insider
trading should even be illegal in the first place.
A. Philosophical Framework
Insider trading bans have been among the most controversial
aspects of securities regulation since the SEC condemned the
practice in the 1961 Cady Roberts case.17 Professor Henry Manne
shortly thereafter published his famous book criticizing, on
economics grounds, the decision to prohibit insider trading.1 8 Since
Manne, there have been many people skeptical of insider trading
bans, and for various reasons.19
Some people have suggested that insider trading does not hurt
anyone. 20 Others have suggested that insider trading does not
necessarily harm the securities market. 2' If there is no harm, it
becomes difficult to justify the significant costs of enforcing bans on
insider trading.22 And if there is no harm in insider trading,
questions arise as to whether the multimillion dollar penalties from
15. Harry S. Gerla, Confidentiality Agreements and the Misappropriation
Theory of Insider Trading: Avoiding the Fiduciary Duty Fetish, 39 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 331, 332-33 (2015).
16. See generally J. Scott Colesanti, 'We'll Know It When We Can't Hear It":
A Call for a Non-Pornography Test Approach to Recognizing Non-Public
Information, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 560-67 (2006) (discussing what
information qualifies as nonpublic).
17. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); Stephen Clark,
Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We. Go from Here?, 16
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 43, 45 (2010).
18. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
19. See Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1929-
35 (2007) (cataloging various criticisms of a ban on insider trading).
20. For example, "it is far from clear whether [Martha] Stewart's trades
were unlawful, let alone illegal, and it is hard to identify any harm her acts
directly caused anyone." Schroeder, supra note 7, at 2023. Ultimately,
"Stewart was not even charged, let alone convicted, of insider trading ..... Id.
21. See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Informed Trading and
Market Making: Liquidity of Securities Markets in the Zero-Sum Game, 3 WM. &
MARY Bus. L. REV. 1, 55 (2012) ("Overall, the current level of insider trading
appears to have no significant adverse effect on equity market makers, and any
further tightening of insider trading regulation and additional enforcement is
unlikely to increase liquidity of equity markets. However, completely freeing
the modern financial marketplace from regulatory restrictions on insider
trading may present substantial problems for all types of market makers, but it
is not a foregone conclusion.").
22. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:
Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2015) ("A movement is
afoot to impose cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on financial regulation (CBA/FR).").
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insider trading bans are primarily intended to make the federal
government richer, akin to high-cost speeding tickets.23
Even if the justifications for insider trading bans are accepted,
criticism has also targeted the enforcement of the bans. For
example, there is the possibility of bias in enforcement of the laws. 2 4
Furthermore, there are separate critiques regarding overregulation
of the business environment generally,25 as well as criticism that
white collar penalties have been steeply increasing in recent years.26
On the other hand, many have argued that insider trading
should remain illegal. This group argues that bans on insider
trading have lowered the costs of capital, strengthened capital
market development, and encouraged economic growth. 27 People
have suggested that bans on insider trading have equalized the
informational inequality between corporate insiders and public
investors. 28
Additionally, some commentators have noted that there are
indeed costs to insider trading because the insider sells securities at
an inflated price.29 Others have noted that there are real harms of
insider trading to the investing public because once the value of a
particular piece of privileged information is used, there is no more
23. See Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC "Monetary Penalties Speak Very
Loudly," But What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC's New
Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 211 (2014) ("Efforts to distribute
funds to harmed investors have tapered off over time, such that the vast
majority of sums collected are still deposited in Treasury's General Fund. This
ensures that the SEC contributes more revenue to the government than any
other independent agency.").
24. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About
Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247,
263 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's
New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
1315, 1316-18 (2012) (noting that Dodd-Frank even extends to regulating
conflict minerals for ethical reasons). For the argument that tax incentives
might be better solutions to certain corporate issues than regulation, see
Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus
Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1690-94
(2015).
26. Donna M. Nagy, Reflective Essay, Criminalization of Corporate Law:
The Impact of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Misconduct, 2 J. Bus. & TECH.
L. 111, 111-12 (2007).
27. Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Economics Applied: Loss Causation, 44
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1509, 1512 (2013); see also George W. Dent, Jr., Why Legalized
Insider Trading Would Be a Disaster, 38 DEL. J. CORP. I. 247, 247, 273 (2013)
("[A] stubborn minority still defends [insider trading] as an efficient method of
compensating executives and spurring innovation.").
28. STUART CHARLES GOLDBERG, SEC TRADING RESTRICTIONS AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS FOR INSIDERS 43 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1887, 1902 (2013) ("[I]nsider trading transfers value from public
investors to insiders who sell their stock at inflated prices.").
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opportunity for others to profit from that information. 30
Additionally, insider trading imposes costs on public investors by
"(1) systematically diverting value from public shareholders to
insiders, and (2) undermining and distorting insiders' incentives to
generate economic value, thereby reducing the size of the pie." 3 1
Among the most cited reasons for insider trading bans is the
promotion of investor confidence in the markets. 32 Similarly, the
prohibition on insider trading explicitly intends to secure the
integrity of the securities market.33 Finally, some people simply do
not like the idea of insider trading without being able to pinpoint the
reason,34 while others note a vision of the prohibition as a moralistic
response to greed. 35
Regardless of the debate, insider trading laws have existed in
the United States for decades. Countries around the world have
noted the impact of the ban on the integrity of the American
securities markets and introduced similar laws based on the
American legal framework.36
B. Legal Framework
Insider trading is illegal under American securities law. 3 7
However, there is a lack of tidiness in insider trading law,38 which
30. JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: EcONOMIcs, POLITICS, AND
POLICY 10 (1991).
31. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
801, 806 (2014).
32. E.g., John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider
Trading, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1, 9.
33. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012) (stating that one of its purposes is "to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets"); Release No. 33-6239, 45
Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (Sept. 12, 1980) (noting that trading on
misappropriated confidential information undermines investor confidence and
the integrity of the securities market).
34. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When is it Wrong to
Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public Information? Public Views of the
Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 445, 484 (2011) (explaining
the wide range of views on insider trading held by the public).
35. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, "Fine Distinctions" in the Contemporary
Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 429, 429.
36. For a review of the development of insider trading law around the
world, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading
Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (2002).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2014) ('The
'manipulative and deceptive devices' prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act (15
U.S.C. 78j) ... include ... the purchase or sale of a security by any issuer, on
the basis of material nonpublic information. . .. "). But see Erik Luna,
Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 813 (2012)
("Consider, for instance, insider trading: Although a respectable argument can
be made that it should be no crime at all, neither legislative nor prosecutorial
decriminalization of insider trading has any chance in the current political
environment.").
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has plagued it from the beginning. 39 Originally, state corporate law
regulated insider trading, with some grounding in common law
fraud as well.40  Federal regulation under the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act eventually superseded them. 41
Modern day insider trading law has evolved from Section 10
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and
grew due to SEC rulemaking and judicial interpretation under
Section 10(b)-necessary because the application of Section 10 and
Rule 10b-5 to insider trading cases is not immediately intuitive or
obvious. 42 Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 was cited in order to
regulate insider trading until 1961.43
Section 10 makes it unlawful to "use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of' rules
promulgated by the SEC.44 Meanwhile, Rule 10b-5 under the
Exchange Act makes it unlawful to "engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 45
To facilitate enforcement, there are several theories under
which an individual can be held liable for insider trading under Rule
10b-5. 4 6 The existence of these various theories represents the
continued expansion of the legal framework to address insider
trading.
The first theory of insider trading holds that Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 prohibit a corporate insider,
38. E.g., Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 928, 931 (2014) ("Federal insider trading law seems to be a 'theoretical
mess.' According to the consensus view among experts, it is 'seriously flawed,'
'ill-defined,' 'inconsistent,' 'astonishingly dysfunctional,' 'enigma[tic],' and even
'an ass."').
39. See id. at 935.
40. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and
Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (1986).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
42. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 38; Heminway, supra note 24, at 256
("The nature of the prohibited conduct (manipulation, deception, and fraud) is
not clearly defined in Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, and neither 'insider trading'
nor 'insider' is explicitly defined (or even mentioned) in these core operative
provisions. The inevitable result of this construction of the existing regulatory
system is that neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 provides clear interpretive
or enforcement guidance."); Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don't Call for
Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2011) ("Insider trading is a
textbook example of the process of creating crimes through delegation to an
agency.").
43. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 38.
44. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-j-4 (2012).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2014).
46. See Gerla, supra note 15, at 332-33 (listing three different theories of
liability for insider trading under Rule 10b-5).
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such as a corporate officer or director, from trading in the
corporation's securities on the basis of material, nonpublic
information about the corporation. 47 This is the classical theory of
insider trading.
The next theory expands insider trading liability by expanding
who can be liable for insider trading.48 Under the misappropriation
theory, a person is liable for trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information if he has obtained the information through
deception practiced on the source of the information.4 9
Finally, tipper/tippee liability also expands the concept of liable
parties to include people who receive a tip in the form of material,
nonpublic corporate information and trade on it if the tipper is in
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation by supplying the
information and the tippee knows or should know of the tipper's
breach of fiduciary duty.50 In other words, if the tippee receiving
material, nonpublic information trades on such information,
knowing that the tipper's disclosure of the information breaches a
duty, then the tippee also violates federal securities laws.
Under this framework, therefore, it is a violation to be "(1)
trading securities (2) on the basis of (3) material (4) nonpublic
information (5) in violation of a duty of trust or confidence owed
directly or indirectly to the corporation, the corporation's
47. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). In October 2015, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for certiorari in the case. Newman significantly narrowed the
definition of insider trading by requiring proof that an inside tip recipient knew
the confidential information came from an insider and that the insider disclosed
the information for a clear personal benefit. The result of the case was the
overturning of two convictions for insider trading and dropped charges against
others. Id.
48. Congress enacted the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of
2012, or STOCK Act, to prevent members of Congress from being able to trade
on material, nonpublic information received while in their government
positions. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291.
49. Id.; see also SIMON M. LORNE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 1:23 (2010) ("Following acceptance of the
theory by the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and, arguably, the Third Circuits and
rejection of the theory by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, in June 1997, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the misappropriation
theory as a means of fighting insider trading in United States v. O'Hagan.");
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Taking Stock: Insider and Outsider Trading by Congress,
5 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 159, 182 (2014) ("Because the classic theory, as set
forth in Chiarella and Dirks, does not cover many transactions that seem
intuitively to be equally unseemly, the SEC and DOJ sought to develop an
alternate theory of unlawful trading.").
50. Gerla, supra note 15, at 332-33; see supra note 47.
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shareholders, or the source of the information."51 These elements
have been subject to interpretation in extensive case law. 52
Critics contend that the legal framework on insider trading is
dissatisfying, and note that "[tihe absence of a satisfying theory of
insider trading law may have real-world consequences. Numerous
lower courts as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) have recently attempted to expand liability beyond what
many thought to be the well-settled parameters established by the
U.S. Supreme Court."53
Indeed, the difficulty of drawing a line between illegal behavior
and mere aggressive business behavior has resulted in a lack of a
firm legal framework.54 While more cases have been pushing the
boundaries of what violates Section 10(b),55 some corporations have
preferred to settle their cases with monetary payments instead of
trials, which results in the lack of judicial interpretation of whether
securities fraud actually occurred.56
There are several defenses to insider trading.57 One defense is
to show that the person accused of insider trading acted without
scienter.5 8  A reliance-based defense, meanwhile, attempts to
demonstrate that "no market participant relied upon the defendant's
omissions or misrepresentations in deciding to purchase or sell a
security."59
There are several mechanisms to enforce insider trading laws,
including civil, criminal, and private.60 In a criminal prosecution,
an individual faces a maximum fine of $5 million and up to twenty-
years imprisonment, while a corporation may be subject to a
maximum fine of $25 million.61 "Criminal penalties may be imposed
in addition to civil penalties and disgorgement."62
51. Samer B. Korkor, Unexpected Commonalities: The Applicability of
Bioethics Concepts to Insider Trading Law, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 692 (2013).
52. Id. at 692-93.
53. See Kim, supra note 38, at 932.
54. Green & Kugler, supra note 34, at 450 ("The law of insider
trading ... makes fine distinctions between conduct that appears to be merely
'aggressive business behavior' and conduct that is illegal and potentially
criminal.").
55. Joanna B. Apolinsky, The Boundaries of Fraud Under the Insider
Trading Rules, 13 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
56. Id. at 4-5.
57. For an excellent background on these defenses, see Christopher A.
Yeager et al., Securities Fraud, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1661, 1706-20 (2014).
58. Id. at 1706.
59. Id.
60. See Panel: The SEC's Perspective, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 519, 539.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012); see also Allyson Poulos et al., Securities
Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1479, 1549-50 (2013) (providing an overview of
criminal penalties for insider trading).
62. Poulos et al., supra note 61, at 1549 (citations omitted) (first citing 15
U.S.C. § 77t(D)(2)(A)-(C); then citing id. § 78u-1 to -2; and then citing id. § 78 u-
2(e)).
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The SEC may bring a civil action for penalties. 63 The SEC
generally seeks treble damages under the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984,64 and its enforcement measures include equitable
remedies such as injunctions, disgorgement, cease-and-desist orders,
and trading bans against individuals.6 5  This represents an
expansion of the remedies traditionally available to the SEC.
During the first fifty years of SEC enforcement of insider trading
laws, the agency brought limited enforcement actions against
corporate defendants, with the main available remedies being court-
ordered injunctions and disgorgement.6 6 Since then, the penalties
collected by the SEC have been increasing steadily in size and
frequency, with penalties over $100 million now common.6 7
The 1934 Act contains Section 20A, which provides for liability
to contemporaneous traders for insider trading,68 and Section 21A,
which sets out civil penalties for insider trading.69 Private actions
are authorized by Section 20A(b)(3) of the 1934 Act, which
establishes an express right to recover against any controlling
person of a tipper or trader. 70 Meanwhile, Section 21A allows the
SEC to bring civil actions against insider traders.7 1
The Department of Justice pursues criminal enforcement of
insider trading laws. 72 Criminal penalties are established under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.73 Departures from the sentencing
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1). For an excellent overview of civil penalties on
insider trading, see David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849 (2012). For an
overview of the SEC investigation and enforcement process, see Dann6 L.
Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 627 (2007).
64. 15 U.S.C § 78u-1(a)(2).
65. Dante Figueroa, Insider Trading and Other Securities Frauds in the
United States: Lessons from Chile, 3 MICH. J. PRIv. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L.
165, 176 (2014).
66. Nagy, supra note 26, at 111.
67. Id. at 111-12.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a).
69. Id. § 78u-1(a).
70. Id. § 78t-1(b)(3).
71. Id. § 78u-1(a)(1).
72. See Preet Bharara, Securities Fraud, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/financial-fraud/securities-fraud (last
updated July 8, 2015) (discussing the number of insider trading convictions
since October of 2009).
73. Convictions for violating the 1934 Act lead to sentencing in accordance
with section 2B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").
Poulos et al., supra note 61, at 1550. Violations start at a base offense level of
six under section 2B1.1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)(2)
(2013). The base offense level is seven if the offense for which the defendant
was convicted has a statutory minimum imprisonment term of twenty years or
more. Id. § 2B1.1(a)(1). Convictions for insider trading under the 1934 Act also
lead to sentences in accordance with section 2B1. 1 of the Guidelines. Id. app. A.
Courts increase this offense level by the number of levels from the table in
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guidelines occur, 74 and some sentences have been harsh.7 5 Although
Congress had promulgated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
order to achieve sentencing consistency in federal criminal cases,7 6
recent high-profile insider trading cases have produced a range of
sentences noteworthy for their disparity.77
Criminally, insider trading ... is punished according to the
gains received by the insider as a result of the trading. In
other words, the greater the gains, the longer the sentence.
The potential punishment is high, as the already harsh
penalties under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 were increased in 2002 to possible
fines of up to $5 million for individuals and prison sentences of
up to twenty years. Given its only mixed success in
prosecuting criminal insider trading cases, the government
has every incentive to make examples out of those insiders
that it is actually able to convict by seeking longer sentences.78
The largest penalty for insider trading was $1.8 billion against
SAC Capital-$900 million in connection with the criminal case and
$900 million in connection with the settlement of the civil forfeiture
section 211.1 corresponding to the loss resulting from the offense. Id. at
§ 2B1.1(b)(1).
74. Rajat Gupta, a high-profile insider trading defendant, is serving two
years in prison for passing inside information to hedge fund manager Raj
Rajaratnum that allowed Rajaratnum to make millions in illegal trades in less
than two days. Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3143, 3144 (2014). The government had asked for ten years,
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines called for between six-and-a-half and
eight years. Id. at 3145. Rajaratnum received an eleven-year prison sentence.
Id.
75. See Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE
L.J. 823, 834 (2014) ("As much as the first-generation statutes and guidelines
constrained judges from case-specific leniency, channeled more white collar
cases toward imprisonment, and abolished parole, later legislation and
amendments in the 1990s and early 2000s turned white collar sentencing in
federal court into a harsh business.").
76. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20 (2003); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38-39 (1983).
77. Mark D. Harris, Anna G. Kaminska & Samantha Springer, The Current
State of White-Collar Sentencing, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 3 (2013).
78. Nicholas P. Pellicani, Note, No Pain, No Gain: The Criminal Absence of
the Efficient Capital Markets Theory from Insider Trading Sentencing, 84 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (2010); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER
TRADING: EcONOMIcS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 6 (1991) ('Where probability of
detection is low, very high penalties are necessary to deter potential
lawbreakers."); Becker, supra note 63, at 1849 ("This Article suggests that there
is probably little to be gained from increasing sanctions and that the SEC
probably would be better served by focusing its efforts on increasing the
likelihood that certain violations are punished and by redoubling its efforts to
move more quickly.").
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action.79 The $900 million criminal fine imposed by the court
"exceeded a Sentencing Guidelines range that was, in turn, based on
all of the illicit profits gained and losses avoided resulting from all of
the insider trading alleged in the Indictment."80 Settlements may
often include a corporate monitor.81
Due to the deep pockets of corporations relative to individuals,
the SEC has a financial incentive to pursue actions against
companies rather than individuals within those companies. 82
However, "[m]arket manipulation and insider trading enforcement
actions tend to target individuals and yield smaller fines and
disgorgements. Median fair funds in these cases were $1.4 million
($2.9 million mean) and $2.6 million ($6.7 million mean),
respectively, compared with the overall median of $16.5 million
($59.5 million mean)."83
II. THE EMPIRICS OF INSIDER TRADING
While the legal approach to insider trading continues to
develop, economists have been studying insider trading as well.
They have looked at the price and volume impact on the day of the
insider trading.84 This Article contributes to this literature by
testing the impact of insider trading on market performance and
price distortion to aid enforcement of insider trading laws.
A. The Economic Literature
According to Grossman, insider traders are a subset of a larger
category of informed traders. 85 Informed traders are those traders
who know "the true underlying probability distribution that
generates a future price." 86  They therefore trade upon this
information and impound the information into market prices.87
79. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Announces Guilty Plea Agreement with SAC Capital Mgmt. Cos. (Nov.
4, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Novemberl3
/SACPleaPR.php.
80. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D.N.Y., SAC Capital Mgmt.
Cos. Sentenced in Manhattan Fed. Court (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov
/usao-sdny/pr/sac-capital-management-companies-sentenced-manhattan-federal
-court-insider-trading.
81. Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 680 (2009).
82. MACEY, supra note 78, at 651.
83. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from
the SEC's Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 355 (2015).
84. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
85. Sanford J. Grossman, An Analysis of the Role of "Insider Trading" on
Future Markets, 59 J. Bus. S129, S130 (1986).
86. Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets
Where Trades Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573 (1976).
87. Efficient market theory, in its strong form, holds that security prices
"fully reflect" all available information on a company's fundamentals. See
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Market microstructure theory, which is concerned with the
exchange of securities, notes that traders in the market should react
to the presence of an insider trader to offset the costs of potential
predation.88 Predation can be conceived of as the difference between
the trading price of the asset and the true price of the asset that
only the informed trader knows. This scenario is referred to as
adverse selection, where one party is privy to fundamental
information on the value of a transaction of which the other party is
unaware.89 As a result, Lawrence Glosten and Paul Milgrom posit
that certain counterparties will increase the cost of trading by
raising the bid-ask spread (a measure of the cost of trading),9 o an
assertion also made by David Easley and Maureen O'Hara. 91
Under certain market conditions where there is a specialist,92
statistical methods can be built that could detect anomalous trades.
This is to be distinguished from a dealer market, where due to the
ability of the insider to split orders across dealers (and exchanges), a
party may not detect any aberrant behavior that may be the result
of insider trading.
According to Albert Kyle, insider traders will trade over a
prolonged period to extract maximum value from their private
information. 93  Therefore, one should expect insiders to trade
repeatedly and in a way that does not cause their information to be
exposed, which would erode their competitive advantage, as well as
potentially leave them open to prosecution.
Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral
Finance, 49 J. FIN. EcON. 283, 284 (1998).
88. Maureen O'Hara, High Frequency Market Microstructure, 116 J. FIN.
ECON. 257, 260 (2015).
89. Examples of adverse selection include a high-risk patient purchasing
insurance or a person purchasing a used car (the seller knows more about the
used car's quality than the buyer). See generally Mark A. Hall, The Competitive
Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 685, 687 (1999) (providing an explanation of adverse selection in the
health insurance market).
90. Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction
Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 71, 72 (1985).
91. David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, Price, Trade Size, and Information in
Securities Markets, 19 J. FIN. EcoN. 69, 70 (1987).
92. The specialist is an intermediary between buyers and sellers with a
monopoly on trading in shares of a certain company. See generally J. Scott
Colesanti, Not Dead Yet: How New York's Finnerty Decision Salvaged the Stock
Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1 (2008) (explaining the
history and role of stock exchange specialists). In exchange for that privilege,
the specialist also has an obligation to continually offer prices for trading. Id.
at 2-3. The specialist was the dominant market structure for the New York
Stock Exchange prior to the early 2000s. Id. at 1, 10-11.
93. Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1333 (1985).
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One would expect insiders to use limit orderS94 to avoid
detection, as they have a lesser price impact, and to trade over a
period of several days in order to extract the maximum rent from
their monopoly information. Utpal Bhattarchaya and Hazem Daouk
find that insider trading increases the cost of capital and alters the
capital rationing function of the markets,95 so failure to regulate
markets efficiently may decrease the ability of capital markets to
perform capital allocation, arguably the most important welfare
function of markets.
Lisa Meulbroek's is the first empirical research paper to
investigate the daily impact of insider trading on share prices.96 She
compiles private SEC files with publicly available data and news
reports to profile and examine insider trading behavior in cases
prosecuted from 1980 to 1989.97 She tests for both abnormal price
movements and abnormal trading volume on the days insiders are
active in the market and finds that price movements on the days
that insiders trade are almost half (forty-seven percent) of the size of
price movements on days when the news is publicly disclosed.98
Meulbroek finds an average run-up of 3.06% on the first day of
insider trades, and a cumulative abnormal return relative to the
market of 6.85% on all the days insiders trade.99 This provides good
support for the notion that information is leaking into the market
and impounded in price. This is echoed by Gregg Jarrell and
Annette Poulson, who find a forty percent run-up prior to merger
announcements, which they attribute to insiders.100 Meulbroek also
finds that insiders provide the marginal volume that distinguishes
insider trading days from noninsider trading days.10 1 She notes that
94. Two forms of orders characterize trading: a limit order, where the buyer
or seller states that she will buy or sell a certain number of shares at a certain
price and the order only executes if another party meets that price (and may not
execute in full); and a market order, where a buyer or seller will buy or sell a
certain number of shares at whatever price the market will bear. See Fast
Answers: Limit Orders, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/limit.htm (last modified March 10, 2011); Fast Answers: Market
Orders, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers
/mktord.htm (last modified March 9, 2011).
95. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider
Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 78 (2002).
96. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider
Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1661 (1992).
97. Id. at 1665.
98. Id. at 1675, 1678.
99. Id. at 1675.
100. Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Stock Trading Before the
Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation?, J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 235, 244 (1989).
101. Meulbroek, supra note 96, at 1688-1689.
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since insider trading drives abnormal volume, insider trading leads
to abnormal returns.10 2
Cornell and Sirri examine an insider trader ring, as do
Chakravarty and McConnell. In Cornell and Sirri's case study, the
ring consists of a group of insiders trading in advance of a merger
announcement,1 03 while Chakravarty and McConnell focus on
arbitrageur Ivan Boesky's insider trading in Carnation shares.104
Cornell and Sirri determine that insider trading's effect in the
acquisition of Campbell Taggart was complex.105
Price was affected and volume increased, but contrary to
Meulbroek's findings, Campbell Taggart's liquidity improved.106
This is unexpected in that an aggressive insider ring would lead
specialists to protect themselves through changes in the spread, 07
and thus liquidity would be expected to decrease. Cornell and Sirri
attribute these seemingly contradictory results to the presence of
noise traders, who are defined as falsely informed traders.108
Falsely informed traders can be defined as those traders who
believe that they are trading on superior information and analysis
but in fact do not have any advantage over other traders. Cornell
and Sirri cite technical traders ("chartists") as a classic example of
falsely informed traders. 09 They argue that the specialist's problem
dissipates when he can match falsely informed traders and informed
traders, as the informed traders are counterparties to the falsely
informed trades and the specialist is not subject to inventory
effects.110
This coincides with Anat Admati and Paul Pfleiderer's
conclusion that informed traders increase activity when noise
traders are present in the market to take advantage of increased
102. Id. at 1688.
103. See Bradford Cornell & Erik R. Sirri, The Reaction of Investors and
Stock Prices to Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1031, 1031 (1992).
104. See Sugato Chakravarty & John J. McConnell, An Analysis of Prices,
Bid/Ask Spreads, and Bid and Ask Depths Surrounding Ivan Boesky's Illegal
Trading in Carnation's Stock, 26 FIN. MGMT. 18, 18 (1997) [hereinafter
Chakravarty & McConnell, Carnation's Stock]; Sugato Chakravarty & John J.
McConnell, Does Insider Trading Really Move Stock Prices?, 34 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 191, 191 (1999) [hereinafter Chakravarty & McConnell,
Insider Trading].
105. Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1032, 1054.
106. Id. at 1032.
107. See, e.g., Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 90, at 91.
108. Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1055. Noise traders are
differentiated from liquidity traders in that noise traders believe they are
trading on special information. Id. at 1032; see also J. Bradford De Long et al.,
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 703, 706 (1990).
109. Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1032.
110. See id. at 1054.
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liquidity and better disguise their activities in the market.111
Therefore, Glosten and Milgrom's finding 12 may not hold because
insiders, not the specialist, prey upon falsely informed traders.
Cornell and Sirri's case study is distinct from other studies in
that the insider ring purchases a substantial proportion of traded
shares. In their study, insider purchases constitute twenty-nine
percent of the total volume and represent a significant increase in
volume.113 Cornell and Sirri attribute all the effects in their study
to the presence of insiders and falsely informed traders because the
target company, Campbell Taggart, did not exhibit any confounding
behavior that could drive abnormal volume (such as news stories
speculating on its potential as a merger target).11 4  Through
tracking short interest (unchanged), volume, and the share price of
Anheuser-Busch (the acquirer), Cornell and Sirri conclude that the
only informed traders present are the insider traders.1 15
Chakravarty and McConnell find a weak link between insider
trading and subsequent stock prices, showing both a lagged
correlation between Boesky's purchases in the market and
subsequent prices-with the strongest significance displayed in the
link between Boesky's purchases and the stock price two hours
later-and a link between Boesky's buying and contemporaneous
price increases.116
However, price increases immediately after Boesky's purchases
may just be a liquidity effect, as any large trader aggressively
buying in the market will push up the price and is thus not an effect
per se of insider trading. Boesky's trading did not affect bid-ask
spreads, the standard measure of trading costs, 117 similar to the
trading examined by Cornell and Sirri.118 Also, although Boesky
contributed to the increased volume on days he traded, he was
responsible for only half of it, with the other half potentially coming
from falsely informed traders or momentum traders.119
By using time stamped trades and segmenting their sample into
Michael Barclay and Jerold Warner's categories, 120 Chakravarty and
McConnell discover that the Boesky trades that correlated with
price movements are the larger trades.1 21 They further conclude
that since insider trading may be beneficial, as it assists in price
111. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Patterns:
Volume and Price Variability, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 3, 5, 33 (1988).
112. Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 90, at 97-98.
113. Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1034.
114. See id. at 1036.
115. Id. at 1036-37.
116. Chakravarty & McConnell, Carnation's Stock, supra note 104, at 21, 25.
117. Id. at 29.
118. Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1054.
119. Chakravarty & McConnell, Carnation's Stock, supra note 104, at 29.
120. Id. at 27.
121. Id.
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discovery, so long as spreads do not change, as in this case, there is
no adverse selection component. 122 However, Chakravarty and
McConnell were unable to discern whether Boesky's trading spurred
the price run-up, or whether he chose to trade on days after
observing such an increase in prices. 123
Chakravarty and McConnell reprise the study but with the
important inclusion of trade direction through the use of the Lee
and Ready algorithm. 124 They find that Boesky's trades (buys) in
Carnation did not have a different impact than other buys and thus
conclude that a large component of price impact in that case was due
to overall trade imbalance, as opposed to the presence of an
informed trader in the market. 125
Chakravarty and McConnell also estimate Meulbroek's and
Cornell and Sirri's regressions on the Boesky data, and discover that
when adjusting their methodologies for trade direction, insider
trading is statistically no different from a trade in the similar
direction. 12 6  They verify with the Boesky data Meulbroek's
contention that higher returns exist on insider trading days than on
days with no insider trading or public news announcements. 1 2 7
Chakravarty and McConnell notably state that their critical
assumption is that all non-Boesky trades are uninformed.128
Raymond Fishe and Michael Robe discuss the impact of insider
trading in advance of a news column. 129 This can be differentiated
from the other cases inasmuch as the insiders' trading pattern is
relatively regular: they trade the day prior to public disclosure of the
information. Fishe and Robe use spreads and depth in the limit
order book as key metrics to measure the impact of illegal insider
trading, ascertaining that when an insider is present in the market,
depth shrinks in both dealer and specialist markets but spreads
increase only under specialist markets. 130
122. Id. at 19, 32-33.
123. Id. at 21.
124. Chakravarty & McConnell, Insider Trading, supra note 104, at 192,
196, 199; Charles M.C. Lee & Mark A. Ready, Inferring Trade Direction from
Intraday Data, 46 J. FIN. 733, 736-37, 745 (1991) (discussing that their "Lee
and Ready" algorithm partitions trades into buyer-initiated and seller-initiated,
based on the party that created the transaction).
125. Chakravarty & McConnell, Insider Trading, supra note 104, at 208.
126. Id. at 193; see also Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1032, 1055;
Meulbroek, supra note 96, at 1663.
127. Chakravarty & McConnell, Insider Trading, supra note 104, at 205; see
also Meulbroek, supra note 96, at 1696.
128. Chakravarty & McConnell, Insider Trading, supra note 104, at 201.
129. Raymond P.H. Fishe & Michel A. Robe, The Impact of Illegal Insider
Trading in Dealer and Specialist Markets: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,
71 J. FIN. EcoN. 461, 462 (2004).
130. Id. at 463, 486. Fishe and Robe find that "only ask depth changes
significantly." Id. at 462, 486. As their data is comprised solely of purchases of
shares, this may be a natural conclusion. Id. at 462, 467.
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These results substantiate Glosten and Milgrom's model. 131
They find that volume increases substantially only after the insiders
are present in the market and attribute this to the presence of
falsely informed traders. 132 The insiders are only responsible for a
marginal increase in volume (9.2%),133 which seems to suggest that
either the information on which the insiders trade leaks or falsely
informed traders are goaded into the market after observing a spike
in price and volume. Fishe and Robe use a control group of equities
in which information was available to the insiders but they did not
trade, and find that normal price, volume, and spread patterns
prevail. 134
In summary, Cornell and Sirri, Meulbroek, and Chakravarty
and McConnell all identify a significant price and volume impact on
the day of the insider trading, but do not have sufficiently granular
data to identify whether the increased volume and price are spurred
by insider trades.135  In addition, each of these studies uses
aggregated data (for Cornell and Sirri and Meulbroek, daily data,136
for Chakravarty and McConnell, hourly datal37), leaving
unanswered the question as to how insider trades immediately
impact prices and volumes. Furthermore, all the studies with the
exception of Meulbroek's are comprised solely of insiders purchasing
shares,1 38 which may provide an unrepresentative sample of data
with which to make blanket conclusions as to the effect of insider
trading. Meulbroek's sample is driven by speculation on merger
announcements, which she shows to have a higher abnormal return
than the impact of other information disclosed into the
marketplace. 139
These inconsistent explanations merit further study, as
Chakravarty and McConnell wrote. 140 The question that arises is
whether results from a small population (with one insider trader or
a small ring) are valid amongst a larger sample or if the results are
driven by idiosyncratic attributes of the trades (e.g., a trader
accounting for a large proportion of trading volume).141
131. Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 90, at 72-73.
132. Fishe & Robe, supra note 129, at 463.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Chakravarty & McConnell, Carnation's Stock, supra note 104, at
21; Chakravarty & McConnell, Insider Trading, supra note 104, at 191-209;
Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1045-46; Meulbroek, supra note 96, at 1675.
136. Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1035; Meulbroek, supra note 96, at
1676-77.
137. Chakravarty & McConnell, Carnation's Stock, supra note 104, at 23.
138. Id. at 18; Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1032; Meulbroek, supra
note 96, at 1662-63.
139. Meulbroek, supra note 96, at 1680.
140. Chakravarty & McConnell, Insider Trading, supra note 104, at 208.
141. See id. at 191-209.
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B. Empirical Examination
This Article tests the impact of insider trading on market
performance and price distortion. It examines whether changes can
be measured that capture the presence of an insider in the market
and how the market responds to the insider's activity. Existing
literature contends that in the presence of an insider, market
participants will increase the spread to compensate for adverse
selection, and this may lead to increased price movement on a trade-
by-trade level as market orders absorb this increased cost.142
The data is analyzed on macro (daily) and micro (intraday)
levels. Employing a dataset generated from SEC litigation
releases, 143 this Article uses a series of time-stamped trades
prosecuted by the SEC to generate data files for both daily trading
and intraday trading intervals. This data provides a natural
experiment to examine the effects of insider behavior as the
prosecution provides an ex post identification of insider trading
within the larger pool of liquidity trades.
In all the cases, the defendants traded on the basis of inside
information, contravening federal law. The defendants either are
insiders-corporate officers who received private information in the
course of their duties-or indviduals who received information from
insiders but do not themselves have a duty to the corporation. The
latter are known as "tippees," as they received tips from insiders.
The sample is composed of shares from the American Stock
Exchange ("AMEX"), the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"),
NASDAQ, and over the counter ("OTC") markets, which allows for
an examination of insider behavior within different market
structures. Daily analysis is initially performed to examine whether
conclusions drawn in previous literature are idiosyncratic to
samples. The analysis is then extended to intraday data to permit
examination of trader behaviors both by insiders and uninformed
traders as the trades occur.
At the micro level, insider trades are significantly different from
surrounding trades in both trade-to-trade price impact and trade lot
volume when compared with trades executed in the same thirty-
minute interval by other traders. The size and volume effect is most
pronounced on the two specialist exchanges, the AMEX and the
NYSE. Trade-to-trade price movements are statistically significant
at the one-percent level for the panel of NYSE and AMEX shares.
142. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A
Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV.
83, 83 (2004).
143. Litigation Releases, U.S. SEc. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml (last updated Oct. 23, 2015).
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1. Descriptive Statistics
As Table 1 shows, the sample is primarily driven by insider
trades on merger announcements. Merger announcements are
perceived as having a greater impact on stock prices than
nonmerger announcements simply due to the premium acquirers
offer for control of a company.
TABLE 1
Type of Information Traded Upon
Total Percent
Merger 23 45.10%
Negative Earnings 5 9.80%
Positive Earnings 6 11.76%
Miscellaneous good news 6 11.76%
Miscellaneous bad news 11 21.57%
51
Exchanges on which the security traded was listed
Total Percent
NASDAQ 35 68.63%
NYSE 14 27.45%
OTC 2 3.92%
51
indicates significance at a 10% level
**indicates significance at a 5% level
*indicates significance at a 1% level
Table 2 shows that insiders profit more from their trades than
those who have been tipped off to the insider information by the
insider. This may argue for stronger prosecution of insiders versus
tippees, as insiders may trade more adeptly and generate more
profit than those who are tipped off. In addition, insiders may be
more familiar with how the financial markets react to their
company's idiosyncratic results.
Characteristics of Insider Trades
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TABLE 2
StandardMean Median Devatio Minimum Maximum N
Total
Profit 178,951.41 59,380.00 369,446.36 340.00 2,425,000.00 53
Gained
Total
Loss 528,140.35 122,086.50 765,274.47 35,088.08 1,938,465.00 7
Avoided
Number
of
Securities 1.67 1.00 2.33 1.00 14.00 51
Traded
Average
Profit/ 278,020.89 86,612.50 553,313.86 -16,683.45 2,425,000.00
Security
Tippee 100,401.39 58,066.83 96,395.80 1,969.00 259,525.00 22profit
Insider 269,082.99 72,594.00 522,243.12 340.00 2,425,000.00 38profit
indicates significance at a 10% level
:*indicates significance at a 5% level
*indicates significance at a 1% level
2. Intraday Analysis
Trade-to-trade returns are computed, and then t-tests are
performed to measure the difference in insider trade lot sizes and
trade-to-trade returns compared to their noninsider peers in the
same thirty-minute interval. T-tests are also used to determine
statistical significance of means of insider trades lot sizes and
returns. The Lee and Ready algorithm is used to determine whether
a trade was buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. 144
The mean and median trade values for the pooled sample of
insider trades, as well as the mean and medians for NYSE insider
trade lot sizes, fit into Barclay and Warner's definition of "medium
sized trades," trades in lot sizes between 500 and 1000 shares.145 As
Barclay and Warner found medium sized trades to be instrumental
to price formation, the insider trades are thus "stealth trades," those
trades that move prices but are not immediately noticeable. 46
Insider trades are found to be statistically different from
surrounding trades in terms of price movement, as displayed in
Table 3.
144. Lee & Ready, supra note 124, at 745.
145. Michael J. Barclay & Jerold B. Warner, Stealth Trading and Volatility:
Which Trades Move Prices?, 34 J. FIN. EcoN. 281, 283 (1993).
146. Id. at 282.
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TABLE 3
Average T- Average T- T- Z- p-
Reurn/ statistic Noninsider statistic Difference statistic Statistic valueInsider Noninsider
Mean 0.0015 2.14* 0.0001 0.16 0.0015 4.78** 3.42*** 0.0004
Median 0.0001 0.07 0.0000 0.00 0.0001 0.17 3.86*
Standard
Error 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003
Difference
between
opening T- T- T- Z- p-price and Insider statistic Noninsider statistic Difference statistic statistic value
price (in
percent) I
Mean 0.100/ 0.55 0.07% 0.33 0.03% -1.40 2.04** 0.0414
Median 0.00% 0.02 0.01% 0.04 0.00/a 0.21 0.04
Standard
Error 0.190% 0.21% -0.02%
* indicates significance at a 10% level
*indicates significance at a 5% level
*indicates significance at a 1% level
Despite the statistical significance of returns, there is no
economic sign in this outcome given the very marginal trade-to-
trade price changes. (The average insider trade-to-trade return is
zero, when rounding to two decimal points.) This Article proceeds to
examine whether insider trades are statistically different from
surrounding trades in the same thirty-minute interval in terms of
both lot sizes traded as well as trade-to-trade price movements.
Aggressive insiders would be expected to utilize market orders
to ensure maximum likelihood of execution. Therefore, drawing on
the theory that a specialist reacts to the presence of an informed
trader by increasing the spread and considering the nature of a
market order to "walk the book" to execute,147 Table 4 displays
median and mean values for trade lots for insider and noninsider
transactions within the thirty-minute interval in which the insider
transacts.
147. These are not order sizes, but trade lot sizes; an order can be executed
in several sequential (or non-sequential, in the case of limit orders) trades.
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TABLE 4
Trade Size (shares) Average Trade Average Trade
- NASDAQ Size/Insider Size/Noninsider Difference Z-Statistic
Mean 947.36 425.38 521.98 0.34
Median 363.64 348.85 14.78
Standard Error 225.55 92.04 133.51
Mean as % of ADV 0.0009 0.0004 0.0005
Median as % of
ADV 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000
Standard Error as
% of ADV 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
Trade Size (shares) Average Trade Average Trade
- NYSE & AMEX Size/Insider Size/Noninsider Difference Z-Statistic
Mean 1,143.66 1,069.53 74.14 1.52'
Median 500.00 329.76 170.24
Standard Error 327.39 278.99 48.40
Mean as % of ADV 0.00191 0.00179 0.00012
Median as % of
ADV 0.00084 0.00055 0.00028
Standard Error as
% of ADV 0.00055 0.00047 0.00008
* indicates significance at a 10% level
**indicates significance at a 5% level
***indicates significance at a 1% level
The difference in the median size of trade lots is not significant
at the ten-percent level. However, the difference in the mean lot is
significant at the five-percent level. This indicates that while most
trades are not noticeably different from surrounding trades, insiders
occasionally transact in disproportionately large lots. One could
attribute this to naive or foolish insiders skewing the result,
although the average insider trades in a more sophisticated manner.
However, as a proportion of average daily volume (calculated
over the thirty days prior to the insider trade), insiders' mean
transactions represent .01%; although insiders may occasionally
transact in large lots, they by no means represent a large amount of
the daily turnover. Thus, it is unlikely that any order imbalance
spurs an influx of falsely informed traders seeking to capitalize on
what they perceive as a change in valuation fundamentals.
This finding, and the discovery that eight percent of abnormal
volume on insider days is unexplained by inside volume, may be
consistent with Cornell and Sirri's hypothesis that falsely informed
traders enter the market when inside traders are present.148 This is
also consistent with Fishe and Robe's finding that there is a
marginal increase in volume on days that insiders are present-
148. See Cornell & Sirri, supra note 103, at 1054.
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9.2% in their case, 149 8% in the case of this examination. This
behavior may also be due to daily trend followers and momentum
traders entering the market when perceiving that there is increased
activity.
This Article proceeds to test the nature of trade-to-trade returns
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ relative to peer trades in the
same thirty-minute interval to discern whether insiders spur price
changes in an abnormal fashion or if they are indistinguishable from
liquidity traders. It has been inferred that a specialist will increase
the spread in the presence of an informed trader, 150 and therefore
one would expect specialist-based exchanges such as the NYSE and
AMEX to have a higher price change than a dealer exchange such as
NASDAQ, as the specialist is able to detect the presence of the
informed trader and will thus raise the spread. 151
An overall look at intraday returns in Table 5 shows that the
returns to insider trades are highly significant only in the case of
the NYSE, with a t-statistic of 2.85, leading to significance at a one-
percent level.: Therefore, the hypothesis that insider trades on the
NYSE are statistically significantly different from surrounding
trades in terms of trade-to-trade price movements is not rejected.
The hypothesis that NASDAQ insider trades are not statistically
significantly different from surrounding trades in terms of price-to-
price movement is also not rejected. Lot sizes are statistically
insignificantly different from surrounding trades under all market
structure regimes.
TABLE 5
Returns Average T2T Average T2T Return Difference Z-Statistic
(NASDAQ) Returr'Insider Noninsider
Mean 0.00176 -0.00003 0.00179 1.62
Median 0.00003 0.00000 0.00003
Standard Error 0.00099 0.00046 0.00053
Returns (NYSE Average T2T Average T2T Return Difference Z-Statistic
& AMEX) Return/Insider Noninsider
Mean 0.00110 0.00025 0.00085 2.85*
Median 0.00013 0.00000 0.00013
Standard Error 0.00025 0.00032 -0.00007
* indicates significance at a 10% level
*indicates significance at a 5% level
*indicates significance at a 1% level
149. See Fishe & Robe, supra note 129, at 463.
150. Lawrence M. Benveniste, Alan J. Marcus & William J. Wilhelm, What's
Special About the Specialist?, 32 J. FIN. EcoN. 61-86 (1992); Glosten & Milgrom,
supra note 90, at 71.
151. Benveniste, Marcus & Wilhelm, supra note 150, at 61-86.
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This Article discovers that insider trades do on average possess
attributes that differentiate them from surrounding trades, but a
great deal of those attributes depend on the trade characteristics-
aggressive market orders will draw scrutiny due to their price
impact, whereas limit orders are less noticeable. The lot sizes of
inside trades are sometimes larger than those of other market
participants at the time, thereby potentially drawing attention from
regulators and surveillance departments.
The results confirm the anonymity hypothesis of Glosten and
Milgram, 152 displaying the strong impact of the specialist in
regulating fluid market performance. However, insider trading on
NASDAQ is significant, yet not to the degree that it is on specialist
markets, due to the ability of the specialist to protect herself against
uncontrolled loss to the insider.
An investigation of this impact using foreign markets with
similar structures would be of interest. The results further imply
that order type matters, but without a database of illegal insider
trades sorted by order time, one cannot confirm this hypothesis. In
addition, characteristics of the insider, such as profession, may
affect their trading practices.
CONCLUSION
The law and economics of insider trading continue to develop.
On the legal side, there has been pressure to clarify and shore up
the legal framework. Insider trading laws have been criticized for
being ambiguous and needing clarification. While ambiguous laws
may be easier to enforce by the government, the courts have shown
discomfort with the gray areas of insider trading laws and have
handed the government many defeats. On the economics side, there
has been work done to examine the impact of insider trading on the
markets.
This Article contributes to both these sides, and it offers an
empirical examination of the impact of insider trading on market
performance and price distortion. This Article finds that trades are
different from surrounding trades in both trade-to-trade price
impact and trade lot volume, information that should aid the
government in identifying and prosecuting insider trading.
However, more work needs to be done in both the legal and
economics realms to clarify and identify insider trading. In the
meantime, the government will continue to have unpredictable
successes and failures in prosecuting insider trading.
152. Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 90, at 71.
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